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BOARD OF EDUCATION v. PICO:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND CENSORSHIP OF
BOOKS IN SCHOOLS
Courts recognize that vigilance of constitutional freedoms' is no-
where more important than in public schools.2 Among the constitu-
1. This Comment covers only the first amendment right of freedom to know or
receive information. See infra note 11. Other constitutional freedoms are given pro-
tection in the school environment. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)
(establishment clause violated for children who are induced to read and meditate on
Ten Commandments in school); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (teacher
and principal may be subject to suit under the fifth amendment if corporal punish-
ment is unjustified); Dow v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1980) (probable cause not
necessary for student searches but a search is unconstitutional under the sixth amend-
ment if school authorities exceed bounds of reason), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1022
(1981); Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.) (religious
ceremonies cannot be performed in public schools under the guise of study), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980).
2 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community or American schools.").
See, e.g.. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (upheld stu-
dents' freedom of expression regarding symbolic protest); Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents. 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (Constitution does not permit laws to cast "pall of
orthodoxy over classroom"); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1276
(D.N.H. 1979) (upheld students' right to receive information).
The schools discussed throughout this Comment are secondary schools. Most
courts agree that factors such as the increased age and intellectual development of
college students militate toward more first amendment protection than appropriate
for high school students. This increased protection results in less judicial tolerance
for actions by universities infringing on those rights. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629 (1968) (analogous situation where ability to prevent sale of obscene ma-
terial is dependent on whether the protected person is an adult or a minor); Gay Lib
v. University of Missouri, 558 F.2d 848 (8th Cir.) (regulation preventing homosexu-
ally oriented political group from using university facilities violated university stu-
dents' first and fourteenth amendment rights), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1977);
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971) (blanket prohibition
by university officials against distribution of literature on campus is unconstitutional).
See also Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1052-59 (1969)
(comparing cases involving rights of high school students with those concerned with
university students); Comment, Not on Our Shelves: A First Amendment Analysis of
Library Censorship in the Public Schools, 61 NEB. L. REv. 98, 99 n.7 (1982) (expansive
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tional rights guaranteed to students are those encompassed by the
first amendment.3 The first amendment protections for secondary
students,4 however, are counterbalanced by the broad discretion gen-
erally granted local school boards5 to regulate student activities.6 A
rights of university students compared with those of secondary students) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Library Censorship]; Comment, Right to Read Defense Committee
at Chelsea v. School Committee of the City of Chelsea: The First .4mendment Comes
Off the Shelf, 14 NEw ENG. L. REV. 288, 300-01 (1978) (compares teaching licenses
given in high schools and universities) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Off the Sheff].
3. Students are entitled to some first amendment rights. They are protected by
§ 1983 in both procedural and substantive matters. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975) (student entitled to hearing before 10 day suspension); Dorstert v. Berthold
Pub. School Dist., 391 F. Supp. 876 (D.N.D. 1975) (school authorities unconstitution-
ally interfered with student hair styles). See generaly 1 C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS ACTS §§ 181-82 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1981) (general discussion on student
rights under § 1983); Golden, Procedural Due Processfor Students at Public Colleges
and Universities, 11 J.L. & EDUC. 337-59 (1982) (surveys procedural protections af-
forded students in public institutions).
4. The precise parameters of constitutionally protected academic freedoms in sec-
ondary schools are less clear than those of university students. Zykan v. Warsaw
Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980). See supra note 2.
Courts recognize that students' rights are not developed equally with those of adults.
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 203 (1972). See also Diamond, The First Amendment
and Public Schools." The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REV. 477, 487-
96 (1981) (discusses the inconsistency of court decisions regarding minor's rights in
school); Wright, supra note 2, at 1032-33 (notes the increased maturity of university
students and fact that they have constitutionally protected rights).
School authorities can impose restrictions on children that would violate an adult's
rights. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1348 (4th Cir. 1973) ("In the secon-
dary school setting first amendment rights are not coextensive with those of adults'
* * ."). See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 n.6 (1968) (sales of ob-
scene material may be prohibited for those under 18 years old); Fitzgerald v. Moun-
tain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (strip searches in schools
may be made with less than probable cause). See also Schiff, The Emergence of Su-
dent Rights to Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 209 (1982)
(compares rules pertaining to student search and seizures with those applied to
adults); Comment, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools.- 4 Violation of Substantive
Due Process?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1250-54 (1982) (instances where permissible
regulations for children would violate adult rights).
5. Though school board powers are derived from state statutes, judicial interpre-
tation has contributed as much to local autonomy as explicit statutory authority be-
stowed on local school boards by state legislatures. E. REUTTER, SCHOOLS AND THE
LAW 24 (5th ed. 1981). Since school boards' powers are derived from the state, they
have no inherent power of their own. H. HUDGINS & R. VACCA, LAW AND EDUCA-
TION: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS § 3.2 (1979).
Duties of school boards vary according to legislative decree. Compare OHIO REV.
CODE § 3329.07 (Page 1975) (Ohio statute discussed in Minarcini v. Strongsville City
School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976)) with N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-e(3) (McKin-
ney 1979) (New York statute applied in President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community
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conflict between these competing interests arises when school boards
censor library shelves,7 thereby denying students any direct access to
particular books.8 In Board ofEducation v. Pico,' the Supreme Court
School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972). Many
other state statutes grant power to school boards. See Diamond, supra note 4, at 506
n.130.
6. Courts uniformly recognize wide discretion in school board actions. See, e.g.,
Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 1982) (broad
discretion allowed to further policymaking role); Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980) (broad discretion means constitu-
tional claims are limited); Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 539 (10th Cir. 1979)
(board within discretion to remove ten texts from curriculum). See generally Nicco-
lai, The Right to Read and School Library Censorship, 10 J.L. & EDUc. 23, 23-25
(1981) (notes the expansion of court intervention from establishment grounds to in-
clude other first amendment rights); Comment, Library Censorshp, supra note 2, at
100-03 (discusses how indoctrinative function of schools permits wide discretion to
local authorities); Note, Limit of School Board's Discretion in Curricular Choice-Pub-
lic School Library as Marketplace of Ideas, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1034 (1977)
(follows development of court intervention in areas previously in complete discretion
of school board). Cf Pliscou v. Holtville Unified School Dist., 411 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.
Cal. 1976) (broad discretion of school board does not extend to activities performed
outside school time or nondisruptive of school activities).
7 Since the election in November of 1980, public criticism of library materials
has increased 500%. Mann, Books and TV-New Targets of the Religious Right, U.S.
NEws & WORLD REP., June 8, 1981, at 45. Accord Note, Public School Library Book
Removals: Community Values v. First Amendment Freedoms, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW.
166 (1981). Many individuals are involved in the dispute over book removal from
school libraries. These include novelists, school principals, librarians, teachers, par-
ents and students. See Marcus, Censorship in the Schools, NAT'L L.J., May 25, 1981,
at 1. col. I (K. Vonnegut expresses concern over SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE being
banned by a New York school board); Mouat, Public Libraries New Target ofRight
Wng's Book Censorship Campaign, Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 22, 1980, at 5 (libra-
nan urges community input during selection process rather than removal on demand
by some facets of community). See also Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School
Bd. of Directors, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980) (students are deprived when books are
removed). Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979) (teachers object to
school board removing choice of texts from curriculum); Pico v. Board of Educ., Is-
land Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (school board
members removing books were parents), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1981), aif'd, 102
S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
8. Courts disagree on whether availability of removed books from alternative
sources affects the alleged violation of rights caused by book removal. See, e.g.,
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976) (depriv-
ing students is not justified by alternative sources of access); Bicknell v. Vergennes
Union High School Bd. of Directors, 475 F. Supp. 615, 621 (D. Vt. 1979) (board's
removal precluded ability to obtain materials), af'd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980);
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.H. 1979) (availability of
other times and places for free expression does not justify restraint). But see Zykan v.
Warsaw Community School Dist., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980) (no allegation
1983)
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balanced the school board's motives precipitating removal'0 of cer-
tain library books against the students' right to receive information."
that removal deprived students of all contact with materials); President's Council,
Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir.) (parents have
access to material and can give material to children thus intrusion on children's rights
under the First Amendment are miniscule), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972).
9. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
10. The reasonableness of the motive is a question of law for the court to decide.
It may relate to either the subject matter or the method of implementation of a partic-
ular action. E. REUTTER, supra note 5, at 25. Both these factors are crucial in library
book removal cases. Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 776-78
(8th Cir. 1982) (favorable teacher reviews of the film were evidence of religious con-
cerns of community and school board). Accord Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High
School Bd., 638 F.2d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1980) (no cause of action because removed
material considered vulgar or indecent); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Dist.,
631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980) (removal upheld because complaint did not allege
imposition of particular religious conviction or suppression of a specific inquiry);
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976) ("intense
community controversy" and favorable faculty book reviews indicate that the books
were banned due to board member's distaste for particular subject matter therein);
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1273-74 (D.N.H. 1979) (interim
board guidelines pertinent to removal questions were not employed); Right to Read
Defense Comm. of Chelsea v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711-12 (D. Mass.
1978) (vulgar language ground rejected as pretext for removing subject matter offen-
sive to board members). See also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977) ("Departures from the normal procedural se-
quence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.");
Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1969) (arbitrarily singling
out armbands protesting Viet Nam War while other politically symbolic conduct con-
tinued was an abuse of discretion).
11. The right to receive information, relied on by student in library book removal
cases, is based on a line of United States Supreme Court decisions. None of these
cases involved students, which Chief Justice Burger points out in Pico, 102 S. Ct. at
2818-19 (Burger, J., dissenting). Accord Brief for Petitioner, Board of Educ., Island
Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2299.
In 1943, the Supreme Court stated, "The right of freedom of speech and press...
embraces the right to distribute literature, . . . and necessarily protects the right to
receive it." Martin v. Struthers, 318 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). Martin invalidated a stat-
ute prohibiting door-to-door distribution of literature on the grounds that the deliv-
erer had the right to disseminate literature. fd at 145-47.
The Supreme Court strengthened the reciprocal right to receive information in La-
mont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). "The dissemination of ideas can
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and con-
sider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
buyers." Id at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Lamont Court held a statute re-
quiring individuals to make a written request to receive foreign mail unconstitutional
because it limited first amendment rights to receive information that is unfettered by
government restriction.
In 1965, the right to receive information expanded to prevent states from "con-
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The Court held that politically motivated suppression of ideas vio-
lated the students' first amendment rights. 12
In Pico, students claiming infringement of first amendment rights13
tractling] the spectrum of available knowledge." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965) (permitting dissemination of contraceptive information). This restric-
tion on states was further expanded in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), to
forbid states from restricting receipt of pornographic material in one's home "regard-
less of [its] social worth." Id
The right to receive information applies in university settings. Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). The government refused to issue a visa to a Belgian
Marxist writer who planned to lecture at American universities. The Court explicitly
recognized the rights of teachers and students to receive the information, but stated
that the writer had no right to a visa. Id at 762-63. Balancing the right to receive
information against congressional power to regulate immigration, the Court did not
find that the rights of the listeners predominated. Id at 766-67.
The seminal case developing the right to receive information is Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Its
significance to library book removal cases lies in the third party status of plaintiffs. In
Virginia State Bd, plaintiffs were not directly restrained by the statute prohibiting
pharmacists from advertising. Rather, they were consumers who wished to receive
the advertised information. Id at 756. Similarly, in book removal cases, novelists do
not bring suit to prevent removal. The plaintiffs are students who wish to receive the
books. Comment, Library Censorship, supra note 2, at 115-16. Accord Comment,
First Amendment Limitations on the Power of School Boards to Select and Remove
High School Text and Library Books, 52 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 457, 470-71 (1978) (since
communication by books is a protected right, any reason for removal must meet con-
stitutional standards) [hereinafter cited as Comment, First Amendment Limitations].
The Virginia State Bd majority balanced the consumer's right to receive information
against the state's interest in protecting both consumers and pharmacists. The Court
refused to accept the dissent's position that since the same information was available
elsewhere, the right to receive information was not impaired. 425 U.S. at 757, n.15.
See Comment, First Amendment Limitations, supra, at 469-70.
School libraries are depositories of information. "Sellers" (books) and "buyers"
(students) form a communicative bond. Comment, First Amendment Limitations,
supra, at 471. Such communication is protected under the first amendment and thus
restrictions placed thereon must meet constitutional standards. School authorities
must show a substantial government interest is being served to justify the restriction.
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.H. 1979); see also Com-
ment, First Amendment Limitations, supra, at 471 & nn.81-83 (examples of substantial
government interests).
For a more in-depth discussion of the development of the right to receive informa-
tion, see Niccolai, supra note 4, at 23-26; Comment, Library Censorship, supra note 2,
at 113-16; Comment, Off the Shelf supra note 2, at 304-08; Comment, First Amend-
ment Limitations, supra, at 467-74; Comment, Student's Right to Receive Information
Precludes Board's Removal fAllegedly Offensive Booksfrom High School Library, 30
VAND. L. REV. 85, 85-98 (1977).
12. 102 S. Ct. at 2810 (Brennan, J.).
13. Specifically the students claimed a violation of the right to freedom of expres-
sion. See 102 S. Ct. at 2804; Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Tree School
1983]
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challenged the school board's removal of certain books 4 from junior
and senior high school libraries.' 5 The students sought declaratory
and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.16 The district court 7
dismissed the action, stating that book removal fell within the school
board's discretionary power.'" The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit' 9 remanded Pico for trial, instructing the district court to de-
termine the school board's motivation for removing the books.20 On
Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), q/7'd,
102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
14. The banned books at issue are: A READER FOR WRITERS (J. Archer ed. 1971);
BEST SHORT STORIES BY NEGRO WRITERS (L. Hughes, Ed. 1967); A. CHIDRESS, A
HERO AIN'T NOTHING BUT A SANDWICH (1973); E. CLEAVER, SOUL ON ICE (1968);
Go ASK ALICE (anonymous 1972); 0. LAFARGE, LAUGHING BOY (1929); D. MORRIS,
THE NAKED APE (1967); P. THOMAS, DOWN THESE MEAN STREETS (1967); K. VON-
NEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE FIVE (1969); R. WRIGHT, BLACK Boy (1945).
15. A READER FOR WRITERS (J. Archer ed. 1971) was the only book found in, and
removed from the junior high. Pico, 474 F. Supp. at 389. After removal, and subse-
quent board consideration, LAUGHING Boy was returned to the high school library
shelves. Id at 391. BLACK Boy was returned subject to a restriction requiring paren-
tal approval prior to check-out. Id
16. 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2801 (1982) (Brennan, J.). 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, . . subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States. . . to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id School boards are considered "persons" under § 1983 and are thus subject to suit.
Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980); O'Hern v.
School Dist., 578 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1978). Accord Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); 1 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 3, § 95 (relevance of Monell in
redefining "person" under § 1983).
17. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp.
387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), a'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
18. 474 F. Supp. at 398. "The challenged action [falls] within the broad range of
discretion constitutionally afforded to educational officials who are elected by the
community." Id For a general discussion on the powers of school boards, see supra
notes 5-6 and accompanying text. See also infra note 28 and accompanying text.
The Second Circuit had previously addressed public school library book removals
in President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972). In that case, the court found no infringement
of a basic constitutional right. See infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text. The
district judge in Pico determined that President's Council was binding and thus he
could not prevent the school board from removing books that they found inconsistent
with community standards. 474 F. Supp. at 397.
19. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404,
407 (2d Cir. 1980), aj7'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
20. 638 F.2d at 417-19 and 438 (Newman, J., concurring). The remand over-
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a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed,2 ' reiterating the im-
portance of ascertaining the intent 22 underlying the board's action.23
If the board intended to suppress ideas, they abused their discretion
and infringed upon the first amendment rights of their students.24
First amendment freedoms25 hold a preferred position among con-
stitutional rights.26 When confronted with a first amendment issue,
turned a summary judgment dismissal in favor of defendant school board. 474 F.
Supp. at 398. Both Judge Sifton, writing for the court, and Judge Newman, concur-
rng, found material questions of fact concerning the motivation prompting removal.
638 F.2d at 438. The court recognized that there are legitimate reasons for book re-
moval including the application of community standards to issues of personal taste
and political belief. Id at 418 n.13. The court distinguished the application of the
aforementioned values in developing school policy and requiring conformity with
"subjective and intangible standards of personal morality or political philosophy." Id
The two judges in the majority disagreed on the necessity for a new trial. Judge
Sifton believed that the book removal had unusual characteristics, because the per-
sons instigating the investigation did not usually become involved in such matters,
and the procedure followed suggested political motivation. Id at 414. Judge Sifton
said he would issue summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Id at 419. Judge Newman,
concurring in result, expressed the need to remand to determine exactly why the
books had been removed. Id at 438. School officials are not allowed to suppress
ideas or "'chill" expression through book removal but are allowed to remove a book if
it is considered vulgar or obscene. Id at 433. See also Comment, First Amendment
Limitations. supra note 11, at 471 (listing factors acceptable as motivation for
removal).
21. 102 S. Ct. at 2812. Specifically the Court affirmed the court of appeals deci-
sion to remand to the trial court, so it could determine the motive for the book remov-
als. Id
22. Id at 2810. The plurality opinion discussed the intent of the school board.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion dealt with the school board's purpose. Id at
2815. Both focused on the school board's motivation.
23. Id at 2812.
24. Id The Court noted that the constitutionality of the removal of the books
rests on the permissibility of the school board's motives. The removal would be up-
held if, on remand, the district court finds the school board objected to the vulgarity
of the books. The action cannot be upheld if the school board was motivated by a
desire to limit student access to materials that are incompatible with the school
board's beliefs. 102 S. Ct. at 2812.
25. The first amendment states in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
.abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
For general discussion of first amendment rights, see Cox, Foreword- Freedom of
Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1980); Goldberg, The First
Amendment and its Protections, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5 (1980) (emphasizes impor-
tance of giving first amendment "breathing room"); Van Alstyne, The First Amend-
ment and the Free Press. A Comment on Some New Trends and Some Old Theories, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1980) (difference in speech-related and press-related freedoms).
26. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). See generally McKay, The Prefer-
1983]
Washington University Open Scholarship
392 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 25:385
the Supreme Court determines whether the restraint unduly infringes
upon protected rights.27 The Court invalidates restraints that imper-
missibly restrict first amendment rights.28
Although favored, even first amendment rights are not absolute.29
encefor Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182 (1959) (policy and purpose behind the
preferred position of first amendment rights). Limitations on preferred first amend-
ment freedoms can be justified only by compelling state interests in regulating a par-
ticular subject. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) ("decisions of this Court
have consistently held that only a compelling state interest. . . can justify limiting
first amendment freedom"). See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (infringement on religious freedom only justified
by the least restrictive means furthering a compelling state interest); Rosen v. Port of
Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1981) (ordinances infringing on first amend-
ment rights subjected to exacting scrutiny); Robinson v. Price, 615 F.2d 1097, 1099
(5th Cir. 1980) (there must be both a compelling state interest to justify a regulation
and no less restrictive alternative means); Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 613 F.2d 245
(10th Cir. 1979) (court fiercely protects first amendment rights).
27. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1975). Perhaps the most common restric-
tion on speech derives from the clear and present danger doctrine articulated by Jus-
tice Holmes in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). To restrict speech, the
words must be used "in such circumstances and [in] such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent." Id at 52. The test was refined in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969). Under the Brandenburg refinement, speech may be restricted if "directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and "likely to incite or produce
such action." Id at 447. For a general discussion on the development of the clear
and present danger doctrine see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 608-63
(1978).
Clear and present danger is not the only permissible restriction on speech. E.g.,
United States Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 687 (7th Cir. 1980) (reasonable
time, place and manner restrictions are acceptable); Bernard v. Gulf Oil, 619 F.2d
459, 471 (5th Cir.) (prior restraint may be acceptable if sufficient procedural safe-
guards are provided), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1033 (1980).
28. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 184 (1972) ("college has a legitimate interest in
preventing disruption on campus"); see supra note 4. The broad discretion of school
boards covers more than curriculum and library choices. See supra notes 5-6. It ex-
tends to controlling the conduct of students. Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 625 F.2d
600 (5th Cir. 1980) (school authorities have the right to make rules prohibiting bring-
ing weapons to school); Reisman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (Ist Cir. 1971)
(school authorities have a duty to punish student conduct which materially disrupts
the classwork of others); Dillon v. Pulaski County Special School Dist., 468 F. Supp.
54 (D. Ark. 1978) (vital state interest in orderly educational system allows wide lati-
tude in formulating reasonable regulations contributing to the decorum of the school),
afd, 594 F.2d 699 (8th Cir. 1979). See generaly Comment, What Johnny Can't Read,
School Boards and the FirstAmendment, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 653 (1981) (overview of
the right to receive information, book removal cases and school board discretion and
limits).
29. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976). The test articulated in Elrod for
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At times, judicially recognizable countervailing forces supersede
these rights.3" A commonly recognized countervailing force is a
school board's discretion to control its students.3 '
The seminal first amendment case illustrating the tension between
school boards and students is Tinker v. Des Moines School District.32
In Tinker, students wore armbands in symbolic protest against the
Viet Nam War.33  Subsequently, they were suspended. 34  The
restnctions on the first amendment states that infringements are presumptively pro-
hibited but appropriate restraints may be permitted. Id. at 360. See, e.g., Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Rochford, 585 F.2d 263, 271 (7th Cir. 1978)
(first amendment freedoms may be restricted to further important government inter-
ests such as public safety and welfare in airports); Erskine v. West Palm Beach, 473 F.
Supp. 48, 51 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (first amendment protections give way to the protection
of public safety and welfare); Childs v. Duckworth, 509 F. Supp. 1254, 1261 (N.D.
Ind. 1975) (prison authorities have several interests which justify infringement on first
amendment rights). But see Abbott v. Thetford, 529 F.2d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1976)
(mere fear or apprehension of disturbance insufficient to justify denial of freedom of
expression). cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
30. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 299 (1976). Determining whether mate-
hal is obscene exemplifies the court's role in strictly scrutinizing restrictions against
an individual's right to expression. "Since it is only 'obscenity' that is excluded from
constitutional protection, the question whether a particular work is obscene necessar-
ily implicates an issue of constitutional law." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
497-98 (1957). In obscenity cases, "as in all others involving rights derived from the
first amendment guarantees of free expression, [the] court cannot avoid making an
independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case .. " Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). These principles
apply to school book removal cases as courts look at the motivations, and procedures
preceding library book removal. See infra notes 75-77. See also supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
Obscenity is not the only first amendment area in which courts carefully scrutinize
the specific facts involved. E.g., Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Cent. School
Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (courts examine school board actions care-
fully when they affect extracurricular activities); Ealy v. Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219, 229-
30 (5th Cir. 1978) (careful watch over grand jury proceedings to prevent violation of
first amendment freedom of association); Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1050 (9th
Cir. 1976) (actual rather than the potential disruption of freedom is considered).
31. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784-86 (1978) (state statute
abridging the freedom of speech of corporations invalidated); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (to be valid obscenity laws must be strictly defined and nar-
rowly construed); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972) (fighting words stat-
utes invalid unless narrowly drawn).
32. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The tension arises from the conflict between the power of
the school board and the scope of student rights under the first amendment, see supra
notes 2-6.
33. 393 U.S. at 504.
34. Id Aware of the students' plan to wear armbands, the principals adopted a
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Supreme Court confirmed the school board's comprehensive author-
ity to mandate and control student conduct.35 The Court noted, how-
ever, that the power does not extend to suppressing expressions of
opinion that do not disrupt classes or school work.36 To justify sup-
pression of unpopular ideas, school authorities must show more than
the desire to avoid the potential disruption evoked by such ideas.37
The necessity for school boards to justify their actions has again
policy to suspend any student who refused to remove the band when asked. The
plaintiffs in Tinker refused to remove their armbands and were suspended. Id
35. Id at 507. "[Tlhe court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority. . . of school officials. . . to prescribe and control conduct
in the schools." Id See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (courts
will not intervene in school affairs unless constitutional values are implicated). See
supra note 28.
36. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. Although school boards have broad discretion in
determining school policy, the power is not unlimited. "The dangers of unrestrained
discretion are readily apparent. Under the guise of beneficent concern for the welfare
of school children, school authorities, albeit unwillingly, might permit prejudices of
the community to prevail." James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir.
1972). See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (anti-evolution law struck
down on establishment grounds); Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1942).
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the states, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.
These have, of course, important, delicate and highly discretionary functions, but
none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.
Id See also Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir.
1982) (school boards to not have absolute discretion to remove materials from
schools); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Dist., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir.
1980) (school board power limited by constitutional considerations); Thomas v. Board
of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir.) (school authorities have some latitude in re-
stricting otherwise protected speech on school grounds), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081
(1979). See also Comment, Library Censorshio, supra note 2, at 102-03 (courts wary
of potential constitutional problems arising from imposition of community prejudices
to the exclusion of contrary views). Cf. Note, Consitutional Law-Schools-School
Board Removal of Books from Libraries and Curricula, 30 KAN. L. REv. 146, 150
(1981) (courts defer to school boards on local matters).
Despite the deferential attitude of courts to board actions "[w]hen First Amend-
ment values are implicated, the local officials removing the book must demonstrate
some substantial and legitimate government interest." Right to Read Defense Comm.
of Chelsea v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 713 (D. Mass. 1978). Accord Com-
ment, Library Censorshio, supra note 2, at 102 (the judiciary cannot defer to school
boards and must remain "profoundly skeptical" of state assertions that an action sig-
nificantly affecting first amendment rights can withstand constitutional attack) (citing
Thomas v. Board of Educ.).
37. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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become evident in cases concerning library book removals."8 In
1972, a New York school board faced an unprecedented claim39 aris-
ing from the removal of a book from a junior high school library.4"
In President's Council, District 25 v. Community School Board No.
25," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found no infringement on
basic constitutional values42 and dismissed the action.4 3 Relying on
judicial restraint,' the court refused to substitute its own judgment
38. See infra notes 39-60 & 75-77.
39. Prior to 1972, there were few cases pertaining to the rights and responsibilities
of libraries. One earlier case dealt with desegregating public library facilities on
equal protection grounds. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945). The lack of precedent regarding book removal on
first amendment grounds may, in large part, explain the summary disposition of
plaintiff's claim in President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457
F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972). See the discussion of President's
Council in the text accompanying notes 41-48. See generally O'Neil, Libraries, Liber-
ties and the First Amendment, 42 CIN. L. REV. 209, 211-12 (1973).
40. President's Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972). The board removed P. THOMAS, DoWN
THESE MEAN SHEETS (1967).
41. 457 F.2d at 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972).
42 Id. at 292. "The intrusion of the Board here upon any first amendment con-
stitutional right . is not only not 'sharp' or 'direct,' it is miniscule." Id
43. Id at 291.
44. For an overview of judicial restraint, see Lamb, Judicial Restraint Reappraisal,
31 CATH. U.L. REV. 181 (1982).
Courts uniformly agree that restraint is required when they review board decisions.
[N]o matter what choice of books may be made. . . some other person or group
may well dissent. The ensuing shouts of book burning, witch hunting and viola-
tion of academic freedom hardly elevate this intramural strife to first amendment
constitutional proportions. If it did, there would be a constant intrusion of the
judiciary into the internal affairs of the school.
President's Council, 457 F.2d at 292.
Many courts have a tendency to defer to school board decisions. "[N]othing in the
constitution permits the courts to interfere with local educational discretion until local
authorities begin to substitute rigid and exclusive indoctrination for the mere exercise
of their prerogative to make pedagogic choices regarding matters of legitimate dis-
pute." Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir.
1980). Accord E. REUTrER, supra note 6, at 25 (courts generally will not substitute
their judgment for local school board discretion if the local authority has the power to
perform a particular act).
The Supreme Court has said: "Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution
of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not
directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values." Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). Accord Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d
711, 775 (8th Cir. 1982) (intervention justified only when the evidence does not pres-
ent a legitimate rational for school board action); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d
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for that of the duly elected local officials.45 The court rejected the
students' argument that minors have an unqualified first amendment
right of access to non-obscene books.4 6 By its decision, the court re-
fused to recognize the theory that books gain tenured status when
placed upon the shelf.47 Instead, the court granted the school board
equivalent discretion to remove books that it had in selecting them.48
The Sixth Circuit, rejecting the President's Council approach, es-
tablished an alternative solution for book removal cases in Minarcini
v. Strongsville City School District.4 9 There, senior high school stu-
566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972) ("curriculum controls belong to the political process and local
school authorities"); Special Project, Education and the Law.- Slate Interests and Indi-
vidualRights, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1373, 1425-26 (1976) (courts recognize expertise of
legislators and school boards to administer school policies). See generally Develop.
ments in the Law---4cademic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1051-55 (1968) (dis-
cussion of judicial restraint based on lack of expertise).
45. 457 F.2d at 291. "Since the Legislature of the State of New York has by law
determined that the responsibility for the selection of materials in public school li-
braries. . . is to be vested in the community school board. . . we do not consider it
appropriate for this court to review either the wisdom or efficiency of the determina-
tions of the Board." Id
46. 457 F.2d at 292. Plaintiffs relied on Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968) for this argument. Ginsberg upheld a statute preventing sales of obscene
materials to minors under 17 years of age. Id at 638. In rejecting plaintiff's argu-
ment, the court emphasized the educational function of schools, stating that nothing
compels schools to become depositories for any book that is not obscene. 457 F.2d at
292-93.
47. Id at 293. The plaintiffs argued that once a book is shelved, it is "tenured"
and should not arbitrarily be removed. Id The court in President's Council found
that neither shelving, or unshelving books constituted a constitutional issue, "particu-
larly where there is no showing of a curtailment of freedom of speech or expression."
Id There must be an authority who can remove books that are obsolete, irrelevant or
improperly selected. Id President's Council revealed that the school board was that
authority. Id Later cases discussing book tenure agree that books may be exorcised
from shelves for the legitimate reasons mentioned in President's Council, but note that
motivations behind removal are relevant in distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate
removals. See infra notes 53 & 75 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Ofthe
Shelf, supra note 2, at 310-I1 (discussing how shelving a book grants it some protec-
tion from removal for arbitrary or political reasons).
48. 457 F.2d at 293. "[B]ooks which become obsolete or irrelevant or where [sic]
improperly selected initially, for whatever reason, can be removed by the same au-
thority which was empowered to make the selection in the first place." Id For a
general discussion on removal and selection of particular books, see Comment, supra
note 28, at 659-64.
49. 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). The district court, relying on President's Council,
had given the school board parallel rights on selecting and "winnowing" library
materials. Minarcini v. Strongville City School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698, 706 (N.D.
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dents brought suit against the Board of Education for removing two
books from the school library.5" The books were removed upon the
recommendation of a minority report which labeled the books as
"garbage."'" The court noted that a school board need not provide a
library or choose particular books. Once a library is established,
however, library use cannot be restricted by the social and political
tastes of school authorities.52 By removing books to suppress a polit-
ical or social philosophy contrary to that of the board members, the
board infringed the students' constitutional right to receive
information.53
Ohio 1974). The court of appeals established a new standard, focusing on the motive
to removal. 541 F.2d at 582-83.
50. Id at 579. The school board had removed J. HELLER, CATCH 22 (1973) and
K. VONNEGUT, CAT'S CRADLE (1963).
51. The report, prepared by one of the board members, stated in pertinent part:
1. It is recommended that God Bless You[,] Mr. Rosewater not be purchased,
either as a textbook, supplemental reading book or library book. The book is
completely sick. One secretary read it for one-half hour and handed it back to
the reviewer with the written comment, "GARBAGE."
2. Instead, it is recommended that the autobiography of Captain Eddie Rick-
enbacker be purchased for use in the English course. It is modem and it fills the
need of providing material which will inspire and educate the students as wel as
teach them high moral values...
6. It is also recommended that Cat's Cradle, which was written by the same
character (Vennegutter) who wrote, using the term loosely, God Bless You[,] Mr.
Rosewater, and which has been used as a textbook, although never legally
adopted by the Board, be withdrawn immediately and all copies disposed of in
accordance with statutory procedure.
7. Finally, it is recommended that the McGuffey Readers be bought as sup-
plemental readers for enrichment program purposes for the elementary schools,
since they seem to offer so many advantages in vocabulary, context and sentence
structure over the drivel being pushed today.
541 F 2d at 581-82. The Minarcini court found that absent a neutral first amendment
explanation for removal, it was apparent that the personal tastes of board members
instigated the removal. Id at 581.
52 Id at 582. Accord Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272
(D.N.H. 1979) (no requirement that the school must provide a library or choose par-
ticular books); Right to Read Defense Comm. of Chelsea v. School Comm., 454 F.
Supp. 703, 711-13 (D. Mass. 1979) (having chosen a particular book, the board cre-
ated a constitutionally protected interest in its access).
53. 541 F.2d at 583. Accord Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269,
1274-75 tD.N.H. 1979) (protests of inappropriate sexual content of advertisements in
MS Magazine was a pretext for removing magazine that espoused unpopular political
views); Right to Read Defense Comm. of Chelsea v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703,
711-12 (D. Mass. 1979) ("[Wlien, as here, a book is removed because its theme and
19831
Washington University Open Scholarship
398 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 25:385
Several years later, in Zykan v. Warsaw Community School
Corp. ,4 a school board faced similar claims when it removed a book
from the school library. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the action,55
stating that the complaint failed to suggest that the board had acted
with intent to eliminate a particular field of inquiry or to impose a
rigid orthodoxy of ideas. 6 The court stated two factors that qualify
secondary students' freedom to hear or receive information: first, the
intellectual development level of high school students;57 and second,
the responsibility of schools to instill fundamental community values
in their students. 8 Thus, in some instances, students' right to receive
information may be limited.59 In Zykan, the students were unable to
establish a violation.60
Recently, the Eighth Circuit found that a school board had abused
its discretion 6' when it removed a film from the curriculum. 62 The
language are offensive to a school committee, those aggrieved are entitled to court
intervention.").
54. 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980). The board removed Go ASK ALICE (anony-
mous) (1972). Id at 1302.
55. Id at 1308-09. The court dismissed the case with leave to amend the com-
plaint to state a constitutional cause of action. Id
56. Id at 1306.
57. Id at 1304. "A high school student's lack of intellectual skills necessary for
taking full advantage of the marketplace of ideas engenders a correspondingly greater
need for direction and guidance from those better equipped by experience and reflec-
tion to make critical educational choices." Id
The development level of students affects not only their right to receive information
but all other first amendment rights as well. See supra notes 11 & 29. See generally
Developments in the Law, supra note 44, at 1052-54 ("It seems unwise to assume as a
matter of constitutional doctrine that school children possess sufficient sophistication
or experience to distinguish 'truth' from 'falsity' ").
58. 631 F.2d at 1304. The court noted that the school must encourage and nurture
"fundamental social, political and moral values that will permit a student to take his
place in the community." Id
59. Id at 1305. "[I1t is in general permissible and appropriate for local boards to
make educational decisions based upon their personal social, political and moral
views." Id (citing Gary v. Bd. of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 544 (10th Cir. 1979)).
60. The relative difficulty in establishing a violation of first amendment rights is
due to the lower standard of protection afforded secondary status. See supra notes 2
& 3.
61. Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 779 (8th Cir. 1982).
For a discussion on the extent of school board discretion and limits thereon, see supra
notes 5, 6, 10, 28 & 36.
62. 670 F.2d at 774. "The Lottery," a film derived from S. JACKSON, TiE LOT-
TERY (1975), was removed from the literature class curriculum. Id at 773.
While Pratt pertains to curriculum materials rather than library books, it is rele-
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Court of Appeals, in Pratt v. Independent School District 831,63 ex-
tended the principles found in Minarcini64 to curriculum materials.65
Pratt held that students have a right to ideas, which school authori-
ties cannot suppress.66 Focusing on the similarity of facts in all book
removal cases, Pratt established a plausible reconciliation among the
prior book removal cases.67 President's Council6 8 was distinguished
because the books there contained extensive sex and violence. Re-
moval of such material falls within the discretion of school officials.69
In Pratt, library officials removed the books as part of an ideological
ban,7" which warrants constitutional protections.71
In its first attempt to address the book removal issue, a plurality72
vant Although the Pratt court analyzed and distinguished the library cases, it fol-
lowed the approach used in the book cases to review the discretion given to school
boards. There is a similarity between using school principals to make curriculum
decisions and school boards to make library decisions. See infra note 65.
63. 670 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1982).
64. See supra notes 49-53. These principles are also found in Salvail v. Nashua
Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D. Mass. 1979) and Right to Read Defense
Comm. of Chelsea v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 712-13 (D. Mass. 1978). Both
cases relied heavily on Minarcini.
65. 670 F.2d at 776 n.6. Generally, school boards have greater discretion to re-
move books from the curriculum because students are captive audiences. James v.
Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972). Even that discretion, however, is
qualified by a concern for protecting constitutional rights. Id
66. 670 F.2d at 776 (citing Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free
School Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), af'd, 102 S.
Ct. 2799 (1982)).
67. 670 F.2d at 776 n.6.
68 See supra notes 41-48.
69. Pratt, 670 F.2d at 776 n.6. "Because the officials in President's Council re-
moved the book due to the extensive violence and sex it contained, we do not believe
that it is. . . inconsistent with our decision here." Id Accord Board of Educ., Island
Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2810 (1982) (books can
be removed if they are not suitable for education); Zykan v. Warsaw Community
School Dist., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980) (community has a legitimate, vital
and compelling interest in the choice of a suitable curriculum for the benefit of young
citizens). See also Niccolai, supra note 5, at 28-29 (permissible reasons to remove
books).
70. Pratt v. Independent School Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1982).
71, In Pratt, the parents and school board objected to the film because of its reli-
gious and ideological message. They viewed the film as a threat to family values and
religious beliefs. Id at 776-77. The district court found removal on this basis a prima
facie case of unconstitutional activity. Id at 776.
72. Justices Blackmun, Marshall and Stevens joined in the opinion written by Jus-
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of the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Pico73 recognized sec-
ondary students' right to receive information.74 Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, stated that removal of library books, motivated
by a desire to prescribe an orthodox view of political and social val-
ues,75 violates students' first amendment rights.76 Acknowledging
school board authority over internal school matters,77 Justice Bren-
nan nevertheless found that a material question of fact existed re-
garding the permissibility of the removal.78
Relying on earlier Court decisions,79 Brennan found school board
discretion limited when employed to restrict learning to a particular
philosophy."0 On the other hand, the Court approved restrictions
based on pervasive vulgarity or the educational suitability of mate-
rial.8" Accordingly, the plurality concluded that the removal may
have infringed the right of Island Trees students to receive informa-
tice Brennan. 102 S. Ct. 2799, 2802 (1982). The Court handed down seven opinions,
four of which were dissents.
Granting certiorari before a trial record was developed may, in large part, account
for the numerous opinions. One first amendment scholar, Harvard Professor Alan
Dershowitz, derides the inability of the Court to wait for a riper case to discuss book
removal issues. "The court reaching out and taking the case at this posture," he be-
lieves, is "very dangerous." "It's another example of the absurd hypocrisy of'judicial
restraint.'" Lauter, Can School BoardBan Library Books?, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26, 1981,
at 5, col. 1.
73. 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
74. Id at 2808 (Brennan, J.). The Court engaged in a historical review of the
right to receive information and concluded that a student's right to know was the next
step in the development. Id at 2808-09. See supra note 11.
1 75. 102 S. Ct. at 2810 (Brennan, J.). "Our Constitution does not permit the offi-
cial suppression of ideas." Id (emphasis in original).
76. Id See supra notes 2-4.
77. Id at 2806 (Brennan, J.). See generally supra notes 5-6 (overview on school
board power). This authority includes the right to acquire books. 102 S. Ct. at 2810
(Brennan, J.). "[N]othing in our decision today affects in any way the discretion of a
local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of their schools." Id (em-
phasis in original).
78. Id at 2811 (Brennan, J.). Because there was a material question of fact, the
court held that the summary judgment in favor of the school board should not have
been granted. Id
79. Id at 2808 (Brennan, J.). Brennan reviewed the cases that established the
right to receive information. Id See supra note 11.
80. Id at 2809-10 (Brennan, J.). "If petitioners intended by their removal decision
to deny respondents access to ideas with which petitioners disagreed, and if this factor
was the decisive factor in petitioners' discretion, then petitioners have exercised their
discretion in violation of the Constitution." Id at 2810 (emphasis in original).
81. Id [A]n unconstitutional motive would not be demonstrated if it were shown
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tion if, upon remand, the district court found the removal motivated
by an intent to suppress a particular philosophy of ideas.8 2
Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment,83 but expressed dis-
satisfaction with the plurality's emphasis on the right to receive infor-
mation. 84 He stated that discriminating against" and suppressing a
particular idea,86 arbitrarily singling it out solely on the basis of polit-
ical or moral judgments, violates the first amendment.87 Justice
Blackmun noted that while board members may attempt to instill
that petitioners had decided to remove the books at issue because those books were
persuasively vulgar." Id (emphasis in original).
The plurality concedes that school boards may "transmit community values." 102
S. Ct. at 2806. Furthermore, they may use discretion to "determine the content of
their school libraries." Id at 2810. "But that discretion may not be exercised in a
narrowly partisan or political manner." Id
82. Id at 2812 (Brennan, J.). The Court remanded to the district court to deter-
mine why the books were removed from the library. If the trial court determines that
desire to suppress political ideas motivated the removal of the books, then the books
will have to be returned. Id
The plurality also reviewed evidence concerning implementation of the ban and
found a strong suggestion of illegitimate motives. Id at 2811-12. Several facts are
particularly troublesome to the Court. The board ignored the advise of teachers and
librarians, removing books based on a list obtained at a conservative political meet-
ing. There was no "independent review" of other library books. Id Further, the
board ignored established channels to accommodate complaints and possible subse-
quent removals. Id Ultimately, the plurality determined that the removal proce-
dures were "highly irregular and ad hoc." Id
83. 102 S. Ct. at 2812 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun agreed with
the plurality's standard of review to be used on remand, but had a different perspec-
tive on first amendment rights. Id
84. Id at 2813-14 (Blackmun, I., concurring). "I do not suggest that the state has
any affirmative obligation to provide students with information or ideas, something
that may well be associated with a 'right to receive."' Id at 2814.
85. Id
86. The suppression theory was evident in Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393
U S. 503 (1969), where the court found that singling out armbands over other political
symbols because of disapproval by school officials denied the students' rights of ex-
pression. Id at 509-11.
87. 102 S. Ct. at 2813-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Examples of permissible
removal include relevance to curriculum, quality of writing, space considerations or
financial limitations, as well as when a book is beyond the comprehension of students.
Id at 2815. These instances do not implicate first amendment rights because they are
legitimate reasons within the discretionary power of school boards to remove material
from school libraries. There is a sharp distinction between these reasons, however,
and suppressing books for "anti-American" content, which is a political motivation.
Id
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community values through persuasion,8 they may not present a nar-
rowly restricted perspective. 9 Justice White also concurred in the
judgment, but declined to comment on the first amendment issue,
claiming it was not properly before the Court.9"
In the dissent,9' four Justices rejected the right of students to have
access to particular books.9" Justice Rehnquist, in a separate dissent,
dismissed the idea of students' right to receive information.93 He ar-
gued that since authors lack the right to insist that libraries shelve
their books, there can be no reciprocal right94 for students to receive
this information." Justices Burger and Rehnquist argued that the
right to receive information conflicts with the indoctrinative function
of secondary schools.96 All four dissenting Justices viewed the dis-
88. Id at 2813 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Accord Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68, 77 (1980) ("perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values
[are] necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system").
89. Id at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring). "[W]e must reconcile the schools' 'in-
culcative' function with the First Amendment's bar on 'prescriptions of orthodoxy.'"
Id
90. Justice White provided the fifth vote necessary to create a majority. In a sepa-
rate concurrence, Justice White agreed that a factual dispute exists regarding reasons
underlying the board's actions. Id at 2816. For this reason, he concurred in the
judgment but refused to discuss the possible constitutional issues without a full trial
record. Id
91. Chief Justice Burger wrote the dissenting opinion that Justices Rehnquist,
PoweU and O'Connor joined. 102 S. Ct. 2817 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). These Jus-
tices also filed three separate dissenting opinions.
92. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "We all agree. . . that knowl-
edge is necessary for effective government. [That], however, does not establish a right
to have particular books retained on the school library shelves. . . there is not a hint
in the First Amendment. .. of a "right" to have the government provide continuing
access to certain books." Id (emphasis in original).
93. 102 S. Ct. at 2831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note II (the right to
know).
94. See supra note 11 (the right to receive information).
95. 102 S. Ct. at 2831 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist maintains
that the right to receive information depends on the right to convey that information.
Id Because authors do not have the right to express their ideas in libraries there is no
coresponding right to speak from which the right to know can derive. Id
96. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("how are 'fundamental values' to
be inculcated except by having school boards make content-based decisions about the
appropriateness of retaining materials in the school library and curriculum"); id at
2832 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "The idea that such students have a right of access,
in the school, to information other than that thought by their educators to be neces-
sary is contrary to the very nature of an inculcative education." Id See Supra notes
55-57 and accompanying text.
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tinction between removal of books and the initial failure to acquire
them to be without merit.97
The distinction between acquisition and removal, however, is not
as illogical as the dissent maintains. It is more difficult to prove that
illegitimate factors influenced a decision not to acquire a book than it
is to prove that improper factors motivated the removal of a book.98
By tailoring the decision to removal situations, however, the plurality
does not preclude the possibility that students' rights may be violated
through failure to acquire.9 9 Nonetheless, since failure to acquire
was not at issue before the Court, the plurality's narrow holding is
justifiable.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion is significant, because it
narrows the effect of the Court's opinion. Because he refused to base
97. 102 S. Ct. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). "It does not follow that the deci-
sion to remove a book is less 'official suppression' than the decision not to acquire a
book desired by someone?" (Footnote omitted). Id; 102 S. Ct. at 2822 (Powell, J.,
dissenting); 102 S. Ct. at 2833 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "The failure of a library to
acquire a book denies access to its contents just as effectively as does the removal of
the book from the library's shelf." Id 102 S. Ct. at 2835 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
"If the school board can . . . determine initially what books to purchase for the
school library, it surely can decide which books to discontinue or remove from the
school library..." Id
98. Because the Supreme Court did not address acquisition, issues concerning the
burden of proof did not arise. Lower courts, however, acknowledge that it is more
difficult to show that illegitimate factors controlled the decision not to choose a partic-
ular book. Legitimate factors that could result in a decision not to acquire a book
include: limited financial resources; lack of space; or a judgment that the material is
too advanced for the students to comprehend. See, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Commu-
nity School Dist., 631 F.2d 1300, 1308 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that budgets limit the
number of books that can be acquired); Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union
Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 397 (E.D.N.Y., 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2nd
Cir. 1980), aft'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982).
Several courts distinguished removal and acquisition cases. See, e.g., Minarcini v.
Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 580-81 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v. Nashua
Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read defense Comm. of
Chelsea v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). At least one court main-
tained that the distinction was invalid. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union
Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 395 (E.D.N.Y., 1979), rev'd, 638 F.2d 404 (2nd
Cir. 1980), afl'd, 102 S. Ct. 2799 (1982). See also Comment, Library Censorshp, supra
note 2, at 136-36 (the actual difference between removal and acquisition is a matter of
proof).
An additional distinction between removal and acquisition was noted in President'r
Council, 457 F.2d 289, 290 n. 1 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 988 (1972) (the author-
ity to acquire school books may be expressly granted by statute.)
99. 102 S. Ct. at 2805, 2810 (Brennan, J.).
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his opinion on the right to receive information,' °° that theory elicited
support from only three Justices.'' Since the dissenting Justices also
rejected extension of the right to receive information to secondary
students,0" Blackmun's opinion creates a majority against this
point.' 3 This is the only issue that has been clearly resolved. Justice
White's reticence in discussing the merits"° makes further conjecture
on the breadth of the decision speculative at best.
Although Pratt clarified some of the relevant issues in book re-
moval cases,'0 5 the Pico Court failed to mention the Pratt deci-
sion.'0 6 In Pico, the entire Court discussed the right to receive
information and the discretion appropriate for school boards. 107 Yet,
in failing to establish a clear majority'0 8 and neglecting to mention
prior book removal cases, 10 9 the Court has perpetuated the existing
uncertainty in this area.
100. Id at 2813-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
101. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Brennan, was joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens. 102 S. Ct. at 2801.
102. 102 S. Ct. at 2819 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 92-95 and ac-
companying text.
103. Justice White's opinion on this issue is less significant because a contrary
majority has been attained. In the future, cases argued before this Court should em-
phasize the suppression of ideas and discrimination against certain beliefs. This the-
ory has been accepted by the plurality and Justice Blackmun.
104. 102 S. Ct. at 2817 (White, J., concurring). "We should not decide constitu-
tional questions until it is necessary to do so, or at least until there is a better reason to
address them than are evident here." Id
105. See supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
106. The Pratt decision was issued in January of 1981, two months prior to oral
arguments in Pico. Because the Court did not mention Pratt the viability of Pratt's
reconciliation of the cases is uncertain. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
107. Eight Justices agreed that school boards might be given broad discretion.
102 S. Ct. at 2806 (Brennan, J.); id at 2814 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id at 2822
(Powell, J., dissenting); id at 2835 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). Justice White expressed no opinion on the subject. Id at 2816 (White, J.,
concurring). See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 72 & 90.
109. Only two prior cases are mentioned. Justice Brennan cites Right to Read
Defense Comm. of Chelsea v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978) for
the proposition that libraries are places for students to expand on ideas and explore
areas of interest. 102 S. Ct. at 2809 (Brennan, J.). Justice Rehnquist agreed with
Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980), which
held that school boards are experts in determining the community values appropriate
for students to learn. 102 S. Ct. at 2829-30 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The Pico decision I I does not provide school boards with discerni-
ble guidelines to follow in book removal cases.' Since the extent of
first amendment protections provided to secondary students is uncer-
tain,' 2 there are no clear limits on school board discretion. 1 3 With-
out a specific standard that boards can follow and courts can apply,
inconsistent decisions will continue. School boards attempting to
monitor the content of school libraries need a consistent, easily ap-
plied doctrine to guide their actions. Pico fails to evince such a
doctrine.
Tracy A. Waggoner
102 S. Ct. at 2810 (Brennan, J., plurality).
102 S. Ct. at 2820 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 5, 6 & 28 and accompanying text.
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